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 Measuring Growth Opportunities 
 
ABSTRACT 
Although the impact of growth opportunities on company value has been recognised 
since Miller and Modigliani (1961), relatively little empirical work has been undertaken 
to value growth opportunities.  In this paper we test the validity of the KBM model 
(Kester (1984) and Brealey and Myers (1981)) on a sample of 278 large UK companies 
for 1987-1995.  Applying standard assumptions, we find the value of growth 
opportunities to account for a larger proportion of market values than assets-in-place.  
However, tests of the KBM model cast doubt on the credibility of these results and the 
validity of the model. The KBM model is highly sensitive to the inclusion of inflation in 
the risk free interest rate, and with a real interest rate (which on theoretical grounds is 
preferable), the model ceases to provide credible results.  The model also fails to 
provide results consistent with expectations derived from option pricing theory 
regarding the relationship between the value of growth opportunities and the value of 
assets-in-place.  These limitations of the KBM model indicate a need for a reappraisal 
of the method of measuring the value of growth opportunities. 
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 Measuring Growth Opportunities 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Share prices can be decomposed into two elements - the value of "assets-in-place" and 
the value of growth opportunities.  This distinction is central to the valuation of 
corporate equity (e.g.  Miller and Modigliani, 1961), corporate financial structure 
(Myers, 1977), corporate cost of capital and capital budgeting decisions (Myers and 
Turnbull, 1977, and Majd and Pindyck, 1987). 
 
Despite the importance of growth opportunities (also known as growth options), 
relatively little work has been done on how to identify the proportion of company value 
accounted for by the value of growth opportunities.  Kester (1984) and Brealey and 
Myers (1981) developed a model (subsequently referred to as the KBM model) for 
separating the overall market value of a company into the value of assets-in-place and 
the value of growth opportunities.  Kester (1984, 1986) and Brealey and Myers (1996) 
have demonstrated this decomposition for very small samples of major US corporations 
at a single point in time.  Based on a sample of 15 companies, Kester (1984) argue that 
the present value of growth opportunities (PVGO) on average accounts for more than 
50% of company market values.  In his 1986 paper (based on a total sample of 9 
companies split between 3 industries), Kester find PVGO to account for approximately 
56 percent of total market value for electronics companies, 43 percent for chemicals 
companies, and 48 percent for paper companies.  Similarly, Brealey and Myers (1996 p.  
71) find that, for their set of 5 "income" stocks, PVGO accounts, on average, for 34% of 
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 total market value.  For the 5 “growth” stocks, PVGO accounts for approximately 66% 
of the total market values. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to develop tests for the validity of the KBM model, and to 
apply these tests to estimates of the PVGO for a sample of 278 UK companies drawn 
from the FTSE 350 index over the period 1987-1995.  We also discuss the appropriate 
choice of parameters for the model and measure the sensitivity of the KBM model to 
these decisions. 
 
The KBM model is simple and unsophisticated.  It can be argued that subjecting it to 
empirical tests is an inappropriate exercise.  We have two replies to this.  Firstly, we 
believe that the measurement of growth opportunities is an important, practical issue in 
finance.  It is an empirical question whether simple measurement techniques are 
effective.  Only if simple techniques are empirically discredited are we justified in 
looking for new measures.  It is therefore appropriate that measurement methods should 
be tested, and one contribution of this paper is to develop, and employ, appropriate 
empirical tests.  Secondly, the KBM model is very widely taught.  This alone suggests 
that it should be subjected to critical empirical analysis. 
 
Applying standard assumptions, we find (consistent with evidence for the US by Kester 
(1984, 1986) and Brealey and Myers (1996)), that the value of growth opportunities 
appears to account for a larger proportion of the market value of British companies than 
the value of assets-in-place. However, tests of the KBM model cast doubt on the 
credibility of these results and the validity of the model.  While our tests show the KBM 
model to provide estimates of growth opportunities and assets-in-place which have the 
properties predicted for distinct financial assets, other tests of the model reveal several 
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 problems. The KBM model is highly sensitive to the inclusion of inflation in the risk 
free interest rate, and with a real interest rate (which on theoretical grounds is 
preferable), the model ceases to provide credible results.  The model also fails to 
provide results consistent with expectations derived from option pricing theory 
regarding the relationship between the value of growth opportunities and the value of 
assets-in-place.  These limitations of the KBM model for decomposing share values 
indicate a need for a reappraisal of the method of measuring the value of growth 
opportunities. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: In section 2 we provide an overview 
of the growth opportunities literature, while section 3 contains a detailed explanation of 
the KBM model for measuring growth opportunities.  Our hypotheses are specified in 
section 4, while discussions of the data and definitions are provided in section 5.  The 
results are discussed in section 5, while section 6 provides a summary and conclusions. 
 
 
2. GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES LITERATURE 
 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) split firm value into: 
• the present value of the uniform, perpetual earnings on assets currently held, and 
• the present value of the opportunities that the firm offers for making additional 
investments in real assets that will yield more than the "normal" (market) rate of 
return. 
Both present value calculations are made using the same "cost of capital" discount rate. 
 
Myers (1977) records the distinction as between: 
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 • assets that can be regarded as call options to purchase real assets where ultimate 
value depends on further discretionary investment by the firm, and 
• real assets with a market value which does not depend on further discretionary 
investment. 
 
Myers notes specifically that maintenance of plant and equipment is a discretionary 
investment and that the continuance of the firm's current activities is therefore 
discretionary.  Real options are not simply associated with potential growth.  Despite 
this tangential comment, the distinction used throughout most of his paper is that 
between growth opportunities and the market value of cash flows from assets-in-place. 
 
Myers and Turnbull (1977) extend the options analogy to recognise that the systematic 
risk of the firm's real options may differ from the systematic risk of its real assets and 
that investors may require different expected rates of return on them. 
 
Pindyck (1988) takes the analogy further.  The firm's real assets are identified as the 
firm's "capacity" and the real options are options to add more units of capacity in the 
future.  He makes explicit the analogy between an investor's financial call option to 
acquire a share and a firm's real options to acquire additional units of capacity.  We 
term this specific theoretical characterisation of growth opportunities the “call option 
analogy”. 
 
 
3. THE KBM MODEL FOR MEASURING GROWTH 
OPPORTUNITIES  
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 Kester (1984) and Brealey and Myers (1981) have drawn on this theoretical background 
to develop a model for the decomposition of share prices.  In both cases, the share value 
due to assets-in-place (Px) is given by  
 
k
EPSPx =          (1) 
 
The assets-in-place are assumed to generate the firm's initial level of earnings-per-share 
(EPS) in perpetuity.  This is valued at a discount rate (k).  The use of EPS, rather than 
operating cash flow, must reflect a decision to separate out the value of discretionary 
opportunities which will grow the business, rather than the value of all discretionary 
investments which would include the maintenance of current capital assets.1
 
The component of growth opportunities in the share price, Pg, is a residual which comes 
from subtracting Px from the market price of the firm's shares (Pe): 
 
PxPePg −=          (2) 
 
For EPS, Kester (1984) uses the forecast earnings for a single year.  If his market price 
is observed in month t, his EPS is the Value Line forecast, at t, for the year running 
from month t-7 to month t+4.  He uses several values for k, ranging from 15% to 25%, 
without offering any specific justification.  He uses the same rates for all the companies 
in his sample.2
 
Brealey and Myers (1996) use an EPS which is an average of the forecast for the current 
year (months t-2 to t+9) and the subsequent year (months t+10 to t+21).  They estimate 
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 k using the CAPM.  Their risk free rate is the current, short-term, nominal rate.  Their 
8’s are published estimates and their equity risk premium is 8.4% reflecting US 
experience over the period 1926 to 1994. 
 
By using forecast earnings, both Kester (1984) and Brealey and Myers (1996) avoid the 
one-off company-specific surprises that may affect earnings outcomes.  By averaging 
over two years, Brealey and Myers make some effort to avoid the economy-wide factors 
that may depress or raise corporate earnings in any particular year.  If the economic 
cycle lasts longer than 2 years, however, the effectiveness of this procedure may be in 
doubt.  As part of our sensitivity analysis, the empirical section of this paper 
investigates the effects of using different procedures to estimate EPS, and measure the 
extent to which the proportion of company values accounted for by the value of growth 
opportunities varies significantly over time. 
 
There are three areas where alternative approaches can be used in the estimation of k: 
 
a) Brealey and Myers (1996) explicitly, and Kester (1984), it would appear, 
implicitly, use a nominal risk free rate.  This implies that the EPS figures are 
treated as perpetuities in nominal terms.  It seems difficult to justify an 
assumption that the real EPS of UK corporations should decline at exactly the 
same rate as the purchasing power of the British pound.  We would therefore 
argue that there is a case for using a method of decomposition that is not so 
heavily influenced by the level of expected inflation in the company's reporting 
currency at the time of the calculation.  We therefore include in our analysis a 
calculation which treats the EPS as a perpetuity in real terms and discounts it at a 
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 real rate.  We shall not consider further how changing levels of inflation might 
bias the calculation of the EPS figure itself. 
 
b) Brealey and Myers (1996) use the CAPM with a historic US equity risk premium 
of 8.4%.  There is a substantial literature on the estimation of this number.  Fama 
and French (1997) report a standard error in such historically based estimates of 
2.71%.  An equivalent long-term historic estimate for the UK (based on 1919-
1995 data) would, according to BZW (1996), be 9.06% (arithmetic mean) and 
8.66% (geometric mean).  An alternative choice of cut-off date within the period 
covered by our data makes very little change in these figures. 
 
There are several non-historical methods of estimating the equity risk premium 
(RP) which generally produce lower values (O'Hanlon and Steele, 1997).  These 
authors state "[our] results suggest that the premium is in the region of 4% to 5%.  
This lends support to the suggestion that the ex-ante equity risk premium is 
substantially less than the historical average of the excess of equity returns over 
the risk-free rate" (abs.).  This paper therefore investigates the sensitivity of the 
estimated value of growth opportunities to changes in the Rp estimate. 
 
c) Brealey and Myers (1996) use the 8 of the share to derive the discount rate for the 
earnings from assets-in-place.  As Myers and Turnbull (1977) have pointed out, 
the risk levels of the two components of share value are likely to differ.  In 
particular, if Pg stands in relation to Px as the price of a call option to an 
underlying share (which should be the case if growth opportunities are options to 
expand current capacity), we would expect the appropriate discount rate for 
assets-in-place to be less than that for the whole share (which, in turn, would be 
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 less than the rate for the growth opportunities component).  We therefore consider 
the sensitivity of measures of Pg and Px to the assumptions made about the 
division of risk between the two components. 
 
Pindyck (1988) makes a striking claim about the practical significance of growth 
opportunities in share values.  He states "That an implication of the model is that, for 
many firms, the fraction of market value attributable to the value of capital in place 
should be one-half or less" (p 979).  However, his paper is based on a very specific 
mathematical model of firm investment decisions.  It includes a stochastic demand 
function for the firm's product as well as a cost function.  Pindyck's conclusion 
concerning the proportion of market value attributable to growth opportunities does not 
seem to be the result of substantial empirical analysis.  The empirical evidence provided 
tenuously supports only one of the variables in the model, namely product price 
variability.3
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 4. HYPOTHESES 
 
To assess the validity of the KBM model of share price decomposition, we test the 
estimated values of Px and Pg against the following four hypotheses derived from the 
growth opportunities and option pricing literature. 
 
Hypothesis 1 
If the company has discretion with regard to whether or not to undertake the investment 
required to implement the growth opportunity (i.e., the exercise of growth options are 
voluntary), the value of growth opportunities should not be negative.  As argued by 
Brealey and Myers (1996, p. 69), companies are seldom forced to undertake negative 
NPV investments.  Similarly, if growth opportunities are analogous to options, it 
follows from the option pricing theory (Black and Scholes, 1973) that options should 
not have negative values.  If the firm is not compelled to take up future growth 
opportunities, and we assume management aim to maximise shareholder wealth, the 
investment opportunities will only be accepted if they offer a return above the required 
"market" rate.  Under these circumstances we predict that the values of growth 
opportunities should be non-negative. 
 
H1a: The value of Pg ≥ 0 
 
Could assets-in-place have a negative value? On the basis of the "call option analogy" 
used by Pindyck (1988) the answer would be "no".  An option to acquire capacity only 
has value if capacity has value.  If Px were zero or negative, Pg would be zero and the 
whole share would be valueless.  We shall therefore test the hypothesis that Px is non-
negative. 
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H1b: The value of Px ≥ 0 
 
Rejection of hypotheses H1a or H1b would suggest that the KBM is not reliable as a 
method of decomposing share values into the values of assets-in-place and the value of 
growth opportunities.4
 
Hypothesis 2 
Myers (1977) clearly envisages a situation in which growth opportunities might be 
distinct marketable assets, although he also envisages that this market might be 
imperfect.  If Pg and Px are potentially distinct assets and the market in these assets is 
sufficient to allow an assumption of at least weak form market efficiency (Fama, 1991), 
then we would expect the abnormal returns on the values of assets-in-place and on the 
values of growth opportunities to exhibit the usual time-series properties of asset 
returns.  We would expect both assets to exhibit abnormal returns which are not serially 
correlated.  In addition, we would also expect the serial cross-correlation between the 
abnormal returns on assets-in-place (ABRx) and on growth opportunities (ABRg) to be 
zero. 
 
Calculation of abnormal returns using the standard CAPM requires an asset 8.  We have 
a share 8 but no 8 for the two components.  The assumption that all three 8's are equal 
(though implicit in the standard decomposition method) seems restrictive.  If the 
growth-opportunities asset has an option-like character, this would suggest that its risk 
level would be higher than the underlying asset.  Indeed, Myers and Turnbull (1977) 
argue that the risk characteristics of assets-in-place will be different from the associated 
share, leading investors to require a higher rate of return on Pg than on Px.  This would 
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 imply that 8g>8x, although their paper do not discuss the extent to which 8g will exceed 
8x.  To test the sensitivity of our results to the assumption regarding the relative 
riskiness of the constituent assets, we report results for: 
 
i) 8x = 8g 
ii)  28x = 8g
 
H2a: CORR (ABRxt ,ABRxt+1)=0
H2b: CORR (ABRgt ,ABRgt+1)=0
H2c: CORR (ABRxt ,ABRgt+1)=0 
H2d:  CORR (ABRgt ,ABRxt+1)=0 
 
Rejection of any of the sub-hypotheses of H2 would suggest, either that the two 
components of share value are not distinct long-lived assets which conform to the 
predictions of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, or that the KBM model for 
decomposing share values into Px and Pg is unreliable.   
 
Myers notes that the process which generates growth opportunities is unclear.  They 
might pop into existence for reasons outside the scope of the model.  He also notes that 
the value of growth opportunities must decline if not exercised.  It would therefore be 
possible to envisage that growth options are short-lived phenomena, and that the set of 
future opportunities available at one year end would have very little connection to the 
set of opportunities a year later. 
 
However, if the present value of growth opportunities account for a substantial 
proportion of share value and the annual level of firms' investments in new assets is 
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 comparatively low, this would imply that growth opportunities are long-lived options 
that stretch out over a substantial period of time.  If this is accepted, H2 is a good test of 
the KBM model. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
Based on the "call option analogy", we would predict that movements in Px and Pg 
would be strongly correlated.  Ceteris paribus, an option gains in value when the 
underlying asset rises in price.  This is a property of standard option pricing models 
including Black and Scholes (1973), and Cox et al. (1979).  This relationship would 
also apply to the abnormal returns on the two assets.  Abnormal returns are used in the 
tests for reasons explained below.   
 
H3: CORR (ABRxt , ABRgt) is large and positive. 
 
Hypothesis 4 
Again, based on the "call option analogy", we predict that both the absolute values of 
ABRx and ABRg will have the same sign, and that the absolute value of ABRg will be 
greater than the absolute value of ABRx.  This is a standard property of option pricing 
models.  If this hypothesis is backed up by empirical evidence, it would support the 
Myers and Turnbull (1977) conjecture that risk levels (and hence investors' required 
returns) differ (and are lower) for assets-in-place than for whole shares. 
 
H4: 1
ABRx
ABRg >  
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 Note that, if H3 and H4 are rejected, this might imply a failure of the KBM model, 
although it might also imply that the nature of growth opportunities does not fit the "call 
option analogy" that can be derived from Pindyck's (1988) work. 
 
Since our data cover only 10 years and we are using annual returns, our data include 
only a small sample of market returns.  We therefore calculate abnormal returns (ABRx, 
ABRg) using the standard CAPM equations.  Using abnormal returns enhances the 
statistical efficiency of the tests.  Option pricing models suggest that other variables, 
such as interest rates, might also be significant factors in growth option value, but, for 
the same reason, our data set is not suitable for incorporating such factors into the 
analysis.   
 
 
5. DATA AND DEFINITIONS 
 
Data for the empirical analysis were obtained from Datastream and the London 
Business School Risk Measurement Service for all firms in the FTSE 350 (where data 
was available) for a ten-year period from 1 January 1986 to 31 December 1995.  The 
final sample comprises 2082 annual observations for 278 companies.5 The analysis 
requires data for share price, earnings per share, beta, the real and nominal risk-free 
interest rates and the market risk premium.  The data were obtained as follows: 
 
Share price (Pg) - Price per share was obtained from Datastream International.  The 
share price was taken as of the end of the financial year. 
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 Beta (8e) - Beta values for shares in the sample were obtained from the London 
Business School Risk Measurement Service from quarterly issues closest to the 
financial year-ends. 
 
Nominal risk-free interest rate (kf) - The UK inter-bank 1 year middle rate was used as 
the nominal rate of interest.   
 
Real risk-free rate (kr).  - This was taken from the return on short-dated index-linked 
securities issued by the UK government. 
 
Both kf and kr were obtained from Datastream for the date of each observation. 
 
Earnings per share (EPS) - Two measures were collected.  The first, (EPS0) is the 
forecast figure for the financial year which ended on the date the share price was 
recorded.  This number would be announced some weeks after the year-end.  The 
second (EPS1) is the consensus forecast at the year-end for the following year.  Both 
these figures are I/B/E/S earnings forecasts obtained from Datastream.  The average of 
these two measures is termed EPS1/2. 
 
Equity risk premium (Rp) - Brealey and Myers use a US figure based on historic 
evidence.  We use 9% which closely fits UK data (BZW, 1996).  However, the literature 
cited earlier suggests a wide range of estimates for this value derived by different 
methods, tending to support a market risk premium less than 9%.  We show additional 
calculations for Rp = 3% and 6%.  In this way we span the range covered by the various 
estimation methods. 
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 Our measures of returns for the two components of company value are defined as 
follows: 
 
i) The return on the financial asset associated with the assets-in-place is 
 
t
ttt
t
Px
DPxPxRx +−= +1         (3) 
 
ii) The return on the growth opportunities asset is 
 
t
tt
t
Pg
PgPg
Rg
−= +1         (4) 
 
These are both crude measures of return which have an element of bias.  Myers (1977) 
has pointed out that the value of a firm's growth options will tend to decline over time 
as some of the options expire.  Since we make no allowance for this, Rg will have a 
consistent downward bias.  Similarly Rx will be overestimated, as it includes gains 
which are the result of exercising options.  If the value of these biases is assumed 
constant, however, they will not affect the validity of our tests. 
 
6. RESULTS 
 
6.1. Characteristics of UK growth opportunities measured using the 
KBM method 
We estimate the value of growth opportunities for 2082 company year-ends for the 
1987-1995 period using the KBM model.  Consistent with Brealey and Myers (1996), 
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 we use a historic market risk premium (Rp) of 9% and use EPS1/2.  Exhibit 1 shows the 
mean, median, lower quartile and upper quartile by year and overall6.  As a check on 
survivorship bias, the mean figures for the 172 firms for which data was available in 
every year are also shown.  There is no significant difference between the means 
(annual and overall) for the total sample and those for surviving firms, indicating that 
the overall results are not driven by survivorship bias. 
 
Insert Exhibit 1 here 
 
These figures would appear to confirm, using UK data, the findings of Kester (1984, 
1986), Brealey and Myers (1996) and Pindyck (1988) for the US.  According to the 
KBM model, growth opportunities, on average, account for more than half of the 
companies market values in every year.  The mean proportion of share value accounted 
for by growth opportunities ranges from a low of 50% in 1988 (following the stock 
market crash in October 1987) to a peak of just over 61% in 1992 when stock market 
prices reflected improved prospects for the UK economy. 
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 6.2. Sensitivity of growth opportunity estimates 
We measure the sensitivity of the results to the parameterisation of EPS, the equity risk 
premium and the risk free interest rate. 
 
i) The measure of EPS 
The forecast of earnings in the forthcoming year tends to be higher than the earnings 
outcome for the current year.  Hence the use of EPS1 instead of EPS1/2 tends to raise the 
value of assets-in-place and lower the estimate of the proportion of value due to growth 
opportunities.  The use of EPS0 has the opposite effect.  The effect of the changes is 
comparatively minor. 
 
Insert Exhibit 2 here 
 
ii) The equity risk premium 
Exhibit 3 shows that the valuation of growth opportunities is highly sensitive to the risk 
premium applied.  If the equity risk premium is less than 9% (as suggested e.g., by 
O’Hanlon and Steele (1997)), the estimated values of Pg fall substantially. 
 
Insert Exhibit 3 here 
 
iii) The risk free rate 
We have argued that the logic of growth opportunity valuation would lead to the use of 
a real rather than a nominal risk-free rate.  Exhibit 4 shows estimates of the value 
created by growth opportunities when kf is replaced by kr, for 3 values of the equity 
risk premium. 
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 Insert Exhibit 4 here 
 
These numbers make it clear that valuation of growth opportunities is extremely 
sensitive to the inflation component of interest rates.  With inflation removed, the 
present value of cash flows from assets-in-place rise substantially, with a commensurate 
fall in PVGO. 
 
The results of decomposing UK share prices into assets-in-place and growth 
opportunities are consistent with the assertion that growth opportunities should account 
for more than 50% of company value (Pindyck, 1988) when we use Brealey and Myers’ 
assumptions of a nominal interest rate and applying a historical equity risk premium of 
9%.  However, Pg appears to be highly sensitive to the discount rate.  When measured 
using a real rate of interest and a lower (and perhaps more realistic) risk premium, the 
value of growth opportunities accounts for a much smaller proportion of market value.  
This suggests that growth opportunities, whilst still of importance, may account for 
substantially less than 50% of company market values. 
 
6.3. Tests of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that the value of growth opportunities should not be negative 
(H1a) since exercise of the option is voluntary.  The value of assets-in-place should also 
be positive since an option only has value if the underlying asset has value (H1b).  
When the standard Brealey and Myers assumptions are used with a 9% equity risk 
premium, the credibility of the method is supported by the fact that the proportion of 
estimates outwith 0% - 100% is low (3.5%).  However, H1a and H1b can be rejected for 
a larger proportion of the data when these assumptions are relaxed.   
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With inflation removed, the proportion of negative values of Pg rises from 2.4% to 
12.1% at a risk premium of 9%.  As the risk premium falls below 9%, the calculations 
quickly lose credibility, as the proportion of negative values rises.  The credibility of the 
model is stretched by the contrast between a basic theoretical model in which inflation 
is not discussed and empirical results which are highly sensitive to the distinction 
between a real and a nominal rate.  When a real rate of interest and an equity risk 
premium of 3% are used, 62.1% of cases are outwith the range 0-100%.  In particular as 
the discount rate is reduced, the number of cases of Pg<0% increases. 
 
As argued previously, the assumption made by Kester (1984, 1986) and Brealey and 
Myers (1996) that EPS from assets-in-place is fixed in nominal terms is problematic.  
However, the results in Exhibit 4 clearly show that once this assumption is relaxed (and 
the EPS is assumed to grow in line with inflation), the KBM model for valuing growth 
opportunities loses credibility. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 suggests that if assets-in-place and growth opportunities are potentially 
distinct financial assets, the abnormal returns on these assets should exhibit zero serial 
correlation and cross-correlation. 
 
Insert Exhibit 5 here 
 
Exhibit 5 shows that serial correlations and cross-correlations are low and statistically 
insignificant in all cases except the serial cross-correlation between the abnormal return 
on the share in time period t (ABRgt) and the abnormal return on assets in place during 
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 the following period (ABRxt+1).  The results seem insensitive to the assumptions about 
the relative 8's of the two assets.  With the one somewhat anomalous result, the standard 
decomposition method does credibly divide share prices into two parts which have 
some of the properties of distinct financial assets. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
The remaining hypotheses test whether the value of a firm's growth options relate to the 
value of its assets-in-place in the same way that the value of a financial call option 
relates to the value of the underlying share. 
 
H3 predicts a strong co-temporaneous correlation between the abnormal return on assets 
in place (ABRxt) and the abnormal return on growth opportunities (ABRxt).  The 
relationships between ABRxt+1, ABRxt and ABRgt are also shown in Exhibit 5. 
 
It is not surprising to find that ABRgt is correlated with the abnormal returns on the two 
assets which, together, make up total share value.  The finding that ABRxt and ABRgt 
are almost completely uncorrelated, and that the correlation is in fact very slightly 
negative, gives no support to the "call option analogy".  Either the options analogy is 
misconceived or the KBM model for share decomposition is substantially in error. 
 
Hypothesis 4 
H4 predicts that the elasticity of changes in growth option value with respect to changes 
in the value of asset-in-place will be greater than unity.  We therefore test the 
hypothesis that: 
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 1>
t
t
ABRx
ABRg  
 
In light of the result of testing H3, it is perhaps not surprising that the "call option 
analogy" fails again.  Exhibit 6 shows the result of a binomial test of the hypothesis that 
the mean value: 
 
1=
t
t
ABRx
ABRg  
 
Out of 1687 observations, only 470 have a value greater than 1 and the hypothesis that 
our sample is drawn from an underlying population with a mean equal to 1 is clearly 
rejected.  The possibility of an underlying population elasticity greater than 1 would be 
rejected even more strongly. 
 
Insert Exhibit 6 here 
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 7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have tested the validity of the KBM (Kester (1984) and Brealey and Myers (1981)) 
model for measuring growth opportunities on a sample of 278 large UK companies for 
1987-1995.  This investigation into the measurement of growth opportunities for UK 
shares has produced mixed results.  The findings have confirmed that, using standard 
methods developed in the US, the value of British companies, like their American 
counterparts, appears to be composed more of growth opportunities than current assets-
in-place.  Tests also confirmed that the values of growth opportunities and assets-in-
place passed simple tests of credibility as potentially distinct financial assets. 
 
However, the results also showed that the KBM method of measuring growth 
opportunities was undermined when inflation was removed from the risk-free interest 
rate.  Since there is no strong theoretical reason to include inflation, this seems to 
indicate a weakness in the KBM model.  If real interest rates are used alongside an 
equity risk premium below 9%, the model ceases to give credible numbers. 
 
The hypothesis that the value of a firm's growth options is linked to the value of assets-
in-place in the same way that the value of a financial call option is linked to the value of 
an underlying share is clearly rejected for the KBM estimates of growth opportunities.  
This could be due either to limitations in the KBM model for decomposing share values 
into the value of assets-in-place and the value of growth opportunities, or due to growth 
options not possessing the same characteristics as traded options (e.g., if they are not 
options to expand the current capacity of the firms but have quite different 
characteristics).   
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 These results are entirely consistent with the view that growth opportunities form a 
significant part of stock market values and that they play a major role in rational 
financial decisions.  However, our evidence demonstrates that that the KBM 
measurement technique does not appear to be robust in the face of reasonable changes 
in the model’s parameters, and that the numbers generated are inconsistent with the 
“call option analogy” element in the growth opportunities literature.  We conclude that 
there exists an opportunity to develop alternative measurements techniques which might 
provide a better fit between theory and observation. 
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 Exhibit 1: Growth Opportunities of FTSE 350 Firms (1987-1995) 
 
 
Year 
 
No. 
 
Mean  
 
Median 
 
Q1 
 
Q3 
Mean - 
continuing 
firms 
1987 189 52.61 54.52 43.06 64.90 52.74 
1988 194 50.43 51.26 41.94 61.45 50.15 
1989 208 57.30 57.52 48.46 67.05 57.54 
1990 211 53.84 54.00 44.25 63.21 54.64 
1991 226 59.84 62.23 54.15 68.23 61.13 
1992 223 61.11 63.00 53.60 70.62 62.30 
1993 242 58.07 62.05 50.44 69.36 60.13 
1994 254 56.47 59.27 51.51 66.34 58.13 
1995 263 54.16 57.25 46.50 63.73 56.06 
Total 2010 56.12 58.19 47.43 66.64 56.95 
This table shows the mean, median and quartile values for the proportion of the market 
value of firms in the FTSE350 which is attributed to growth opportunities according to 
the Kester (1984) and Brealey and Myers (1981) (KBM) model.  Values are calculated 
assuming a risk premium of 9% and a nominal rate of interest (UK inter bank 1 year 
middle rate).  Earnings per share are calculated as the average of current earnings per 
share and the I/B/E/S forecast earnings per share for the next 12 months.  From a total 
sample of 2082 observations, 72 (3.5%) were excluded where the calculated value of 
growth opportunities was either negative (50 observations) or exceeded 100% of the 
share price (22 observations) (see hypothesis 1).  The mean is also given for a subset of 
172 firms for which growth opportunities could be calculated for each of the nine years 
examined.   
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 Exhibit 2: Sensitivity of Growth Opportunities Estimates to Measurement of 
Earnings Per Share 
 
YEAR EPS1/2 EPS0 EPS1
1987 52.61 56.11 50.14 
1988 50.43 53.47 47.68 
1989 57.30 60.03 54.56 
1990 53.84 55.41 52.11 
1991 59.84 62.64 56.79 
1992 61.11 62.57 57.46 
1993 58.07 60.59 56.11 
1994 56.47 58.91 54.16 
1995 54.16 56.97 51.60 
    
Mean 56.12 58.63 53.57 
Median 58.19 60.84 55.51 
Q1 47.44 50.06 44.57 
Q3 66.63 69.09 64.12 
Percent <0% 2.4 1.9 3.1 
Percent >100% 1.1 1.8 0.5 
Mean values of PVGO are calculated using three different measures of EPS.  EPS0 is 
the earnings per share forecast for the current year, EPS1 is the forecast earnings per 
share for the next 12 months and EPS1/2 is the average of current earnings per share and 
the forecast earnings per share for the next 12 months. 
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 Exhibit 3: The Sensitivity of Growth Opportunities to the Equity Risk Premium 
 
 Risk Premium 
 3% 6% 9% 
1987 35.48 45.06 52.61 
1988 33.90 43.53 50.43 
1989 44.56 51.21 57.30 
1990 40.82 47.65 53.84 
1991 46.23 53.53 59.84 
1992 43.65 53.35 61.11 
1993 36.89 50.08 58.07 
1994 37.23 48.71 56.47 
1995 31.49 45.85 54.16 
    
Mean 38.92 48.89 56.12 
Median 38.98 50.39 58.19 
Q1 26.91 38.79 47.44 
Q3 50.08 59.64 66.63 
Percent <0% 10.5 4.7 2.4 
Percent >100% 1.1 1.1 1.1 
The table displays the mean percentage value of PVGO with different equity risk 
premia, assuming a nominal risk free interest rate. 
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 Exhibit 4: The Sensitivity of Growth Opportunities to the Inflation Assumption 
 Risk Premium 
Year 3% 6% 9% 
1987 19.42 25.93 35.39 
1988 19.67 23.56 28.87 
1989 23.91 25.79 31.88 
1990 28.60 26.04 28.60 
1991 20.61 31.88 43.53 
1992 25.98 39.58 50.65 
1993 23.90 40.60 52.76 
1994 22.39 36.76 47.73 
1995 19.10 32.98 45.68 
    
Mean 22.67 33.33 41.87 
Median 19.24 33.24 43.88 
Q1 9.51 18.60 26.58 
Q3 31.12 46.14 56.56 
Percent <0% 61.0 29.4 12.1 
Percent >100% 1.1 1.1 1.1 
The table displays the mean percentage value of PVGO with different equity risk 
premia, assuming a real risk free interest rate. 
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 Exhibit 5: Serial and Cross-Correlation Coefficients for Abnormal Returns 
 
Panel A: Correlation Coefficients for Abnormal Returns to the Components of the KBM 
Model Using Equal Betas 
   ABRgt   ABRxt  ABRet+1  ABRgt+1  ABRxt+1
 ABRet    0.2279**    0.2194**    0.0513   -0.0276    0.1585** 
 ABRgt    -0.0060    0.0187   -0.0121    0.0296 
 ABRxt     -0.0050    0.0083   -0.0017 
 ABRet+1       0.2168**    0.3125** 
 ABRgt+1        0.0043 
 
Panel B: Correlation Coefficients for Abnormal Returns to the Components of the KBM 
Model Using Weighted Betas 
 ABRgt  ABRxt ABRet+1 ABRgt+1 ABRxt+1
ABRet    0.2283**    0.2229**    0.0513   -0.0280    0.1606** 
ABRgt    -0.0040    0.0189   -0.0111    0.0248 
ABRxt     -0.0033    0.0064    0.0128 
ABRet+1       0.2173**    0.3199** 
ABRgt+1        0.0074 
These tables show the serial and cross-correlations between the abnormal returns to the 
various components of the KBM model.  Abnormal returns are calculated using CAPM.  
In exhibit 5a we assume 8g=8x, while in exhibit 5b we assume 8g=28x.   
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 Exhibit 6: Elasticity of the Components of the KBM Model 
Category N Observed 
proportion 
Test proportion Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed)  
Elasticity 
coefficient <1 
1217 0.72 0.50 0.000a
Elasticity 
coefficient >1 
470 0.28   
Total 1687 1.00   
Table shows a binomial test of an elasticity coefficient calculated by dividing ABRgt by 
ABRxt.  Abnormal returns have been calculated assuming 8g=8x.  
a based on Z approximation. 
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 NOTES 
                                                          
1 Thus despite Myers (1977) recognising the option not to replace assets-in–place, the 
KBM model does not value this option, but rather concentrates on the choice of whether 
or not to increase capacity. 
2 The methodology applied by Kester in his 1986 paper is not explicitly stated, although 
appears to be similar to that applied in his 1984 paper. 
3 This paper is concerned with the measurement of the value of growth opportunities.  
Various papers have applied indicators of the presence of growth opportunities, such as 
market to book values of equity (Chung and Charoenwong, 1991, Barclay and Smith, 
1995), and Tobin’s Q (Ben-Horim and Callen, 1989).  Such proxies for the value of 
growth opportunities are not analysed in this paper. 
4 Myers' more flexible presentation (1977) would appear to include the possibility that 
valuable growth opportunities could be firm-specific and hence, perhaps, linked to the 
continued ownership by the firm of assets with negative earning power.  This alternative 
interpretation of growth opportunities is inconsistent with the KBM model, where the 
choice is whether or not to expand existing capacity.  As previously discussed, an 
analysis of Myers’ replacement options is outwith the scope of this paper. 
5 The database constructed for this study went back to 1986.  Full data was not available 
in earlier years.  Since several tests involve prior year’s data for the calculation of 
returns, results are reported for 1987-1995. 
6 The KBM model was proposed by authors who were obviously aware that company 
earnings are sometimes negative and that the model would not be applicable in these 
cases.  To carry out further tests of the model in the appropriate context, we exclude the 
cases for which it fails the preliminary hurdle (i.e., where Pg<0 or where Pg> Pe).  In 
2.4% of the cases (50 observations), the value of Pg was negative, and 1.1% of the cases 
(22 observations), Pg values exceeded 100% (implying negative Px).  These 
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observations have been excluded from the analysis in exhibit 1.  (It should also be noted 
that were these observations to be included, the statistics would suffer from major 
outlier problems, with the statistics being non-robust). 
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